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ESSAY 
The University in the Manner of 
Tiananmen Square 
By WILLIAM vAN ALsTYNE* 
The university academic council assembled in the room where it 
customarily met. The agenda had been distributed well in advance. 
Alternative formulations of a new university offensive verbal conduct 
rule was under consideration this afternoon. The council would fi-
nally decide the appropriate standard to submit to the Board of Trust-
ees. These were the choices to be discussed and voted on today: 
RULE I. No member of the faculty, student body, or staff 
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment 
on campus, or some part thereof, offensive.1 
IsT ALTERNATIVE RULE I. No member of the faculty, stu-
dent body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders 
the environment on campus, or some part thereof, offensive. This 
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual 
nature, and not otherwise. 
2ND ALTERNATIVE RULE I. No member of the faculty, stu-
dent body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders 
the environment on campus, or some part thereof, offensive. This 
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual 
or religious nature, and not otherwise. 
3RD ALTERNATIVE RULE I. No member of the faculty, stu-
dent body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders 
the environment on campus, or some part thereof, offensive. This 
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual, 
religious, or racial nature, and not otherwise. 
* William R. and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. [With 
thanks to Daniel Defoe, for his useful original essay, The Shortest Way With the Dissenters: 
Or Proposals for the Establishment of the Church (London, 1703); and also to Catherine 
MacKinnon, Richard Delgado, Marl Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, Thomas Grey, and Cass 
Sunstein for their highly instructive views.] 
1. See also RuLE II ("Any member of the university community who engages in any 
verbal conduct contrary to Rule I shall be subject to suspension, dismissal, or other appro-
priate sanction as the Committee on Offensive Verbal Conduct shall decide."). 
[1] 
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4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I. No member of the faculty, stu-
dent body, or staff shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders 
the environment on campus, or some part thereof, offensive. This 
rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual, 
religious, racial, or other nature reflecting an improper and un-
reasonable attitude toward others according to the common stan-
dard of the university community, and not otherwise. 
A Short History of-How the University Came to Adopt the 
4th Alternative to.·Rule I 
i. 
The rule first proposed for approval and vote was the rule simply 
forbidding offensive speech. This, of course, was the essential idea of 
RULE I. The general purpose of the rule was simply to make the cam-
pus a more pleasant environment for those participating in the univer-
sity, to create a hospitable environment in which to carry on work-
whether as students, faculty, administration and staff, or as regular 
and valued employees. . · , 
But this original, broadly-framed proposal was quickly dismissed 
as, at best, well-intended but nevertheless poorly conceived. The idea 
was too sweeping. Could complaints be brought and charges pursued 
before a committee empowered to put anyone at risk insofar as the 
committee were satisfied, after investigation and hearing, that one's 
"verbal conduct" did-in some fashion-seriously offend others (and 
so, as to them, render the environment, or some part thereof, offen-
sive)? Surely, offensiveness per s~ could, not be an appropriate test. 
This was vastly too broad and altogether too chilling for anyone's 
taste. It reached all "verbal conduct" rendering "the environment" on 
campus, or any part of the campus, "offensive." But what would that 
mean? An "offensive environment," it was asked, for example, to 
whom? To students attending a particular class? To others, not in 
that class, who learned what was said by a faculty member or other 
students? Not offensive to students (or not only to students), but of-
fensive to other faculty, to trustees, to alumni on campus, to adminis-
trators, or to staff? "Offensive," moreover, in what way? Merely in 
one's choice of particular terms?2 In the very nature of the informa-
tion imparted?3 Or, rather, the conclusions summarized or offered as 
opinion, in or out of class? Or "offensive" merely in the apparent 
2. E.g., graphic, rather than euphemistic, usages or depictions? 
3. Information, for instance, some might deem inappropriate to present (due to its 
offensive implications), like tabulations of SAT scores by race, or tabulations of mv infec-
tion rate variations correlated by specific sex practices of various groups? 
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callousness of one's values as such-values affronting the values of 
others on campus, or on some part of the campus where they worked? 
The entire notion of proceeding in this way was hopeless. The 
implicit censorship of the proposal, and the standard it employed, 
were too much like the chilling fatwa issued worldwide on Salman 
Rushdie for having authored his. religiously offensive {blasphemous) 
work of fiction, THE SATANIC VERSES-a work condemned and an 
author sentenced to death for his offensive (mis)portrayal of the life 
of the Prophet. No member of the council was willing to accept any 
rule cast in terms so loose as to lend themselves to levelling the cam-
pus in any of these ways. The proposal as projected in RuLE I was 
quickly tabled. The council turned at once to the first alternative pro-
posal, hoping it would avoid ,most-perhaps all-of the problems 
compelling the council's decision not to recommend the original ver-
sion of RULE I. 
ii. 
Initially, 1sT ALTERNATIVE RULE I looked considerably more 
promising because it was so much more specific and narrow. It had 
come to the council as a concrete proposal from a special task force on 
sexual harassment. It had particular point because of the still recent 
(and disturbing) Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings that nearly all 
had seen on network broadcasts. And it was given particular point, 
too, by the council's own understanding that some rule roughly of this 
sort was expected of the university under federal law. Titles VI and 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of '1964, as amended, and Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments Act of 1972, evidently required all institu-
tions receiving any federal assistance to forbid sexual harassment. 
The proposal was designed specifically to meet that requirement, and 
in doing so it tried not to go beyond that specific concern. In contrast 
with RULE I, it was thus deliberately very limited; it would reach only 
offensive verbal conduct "of a sexual nature," and it took exact care 
so to say.4 
In the course of discussion, however, the council came to under-
stand that 1sT ALTERNATIVE RULE I would put the university in a 
4. Isr ALTERNATIVE RULE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff shall 
engage in any verbal conduct that renderS the environment on campus, or some part 
thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual 
nature, and not otherwise." (Note the comportment of this draft to the E.E.O.C. require-
ment, 29 C.P.R. § 1604.11 {1992), directing employers to "take all steps necessary,'' includ-
ing "developing appropriate sanctions,'' to eliminate "verbal conduct of a sexual nature 
[having] the purpose or effect of creating an ... offensive working environment."). 
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most awkward position-for what the rule left out. While the rule 
was initially well-received (it was taken for granted that it was meant 
principally to protect women on campus from being subjected to hu-
miliating remarks, denigrative jokes, etc.), as now drafted it left out of 
account religiously denigrative or humiliating verbal conduct of a like 
sort (e.g., "jokes" about Jews). Evidently, these would not be treated 
in the same fashion as abusive verbal descriptions of women (or of 
men). Was this really to be so? It required but little discussion for the 
council to concede that the failure to include verbal conduct of a relig-
iously aspersive nature was a mistake insofar as 1sT ALTERNATIVE 
RuLE I treated the humiliation of others by religion as of unequal 
concern (indeed, by its terms, of NO concern) as humiliation by sex. 
So to avoid that impression the council moved to 2ND ALTERNATIVE 
RULEJ.S 
iii. 
But the discussion about abusive or offensive "verbal conduct of 
a sexual or religious nature," now subject to the proposed rule, only 
made the council more sharply aware that the same point made as to 
religion applied with at least equal force to verbal conduct of a ra-
cially-aspersive (and offensive) nature as well. And how was one to 
feel about that? Was it to be true that offensive utterances (i.e., 
denigrative utterances) would be subject to complaint only if insulting 
toward others based on gender or religion? Was racial disparagement 
truly to be treated as less inappropriate on campus, or less subject to 
sanction (indeed, subject to no sanction at all)? How was that possi-
ble? The very idea was startling. Something was clearly wrong. 
Several council members suggested that this must be a red her-
ring. Though the new rule would, by its terms, reach only verbal con-
duct of a "sexual nature" (now amended to include religious 
disparagement), and only then insofar as it rendered the campus envi-
ronment (or some part thereof) "offensive", and though the new rule 
admittedly did not apply to "racist" verbal conduct, it was false to 
claim that such beh~vior was somehow thereby in any way meant to 
5. 2ND ALTERNATIVE RULE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff 
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment on campus, or some part 
thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual 
or religious nature, and not otherwise." (The council was well advised to make this adjust-
ment in the proposed rule; a footnote accompanying the E.E.O.C. directive to employers, 
see supra note 4, declares that the "same principle" requiring them to take action against 
"verbal conduct of a sexual nature [having] the purpose or effect of creating an ... offen-
sive working environment" applies identically in respect to such conduct of a religious 
nature as well (and so, too, as to race). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, n.1 (1992)). 
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be condoned. Presumably-this in answer to a sharp question-it was 
already subject to discipline by some other rule. If not (and the 
speaker conceded that there seemed to be no such specific rule), then 
assuredly it should be added, and added quickly, as it easily could be. 
Several thought this surely must be right. In response to the first 
point, however, there seemed to be no pre-existing, adequate rule the 
previous speakers could point to. Moreover, whatever might have 
been thought in the past, it provided no reason to leave out offensive 
racial verbal conduct from the proposed rule, insofar as the council 
itself was now about the specific business of recommending what was 
to be the proper regulation of unacceptable offensive verbal conduct 
at the university. Additionally, as a member of the council ob-
served-and this point seemed especially strong-. in having already 
extended the rule to make clear that offensive verbal conduct of a 
religious nature was to be covered, to fail to include the same treat-
ment of race could rightly be regarded as a callous inversion of priori-
ties-an act of willful discrimination by the council itself. The point 
hung in the air, awaiting a satisfactory response. 
. l 
iv. 
But before the council even moved to a vote on 3RD ALTERNA-
TIVE RULE 16 (as, by now, many had already been persuaded to do), 
the discussion had become increasingly awkward for others in the 
council. Prompted by the unexpected turn the more general discus-
sion was taking, they had begun thinking of still other issues, and 
other analogies. By leaving out verbal conduct denigrating to others 
(and making the campus environment oppressive to them) by yet 
other, indistinguishable kinds of belittling depictions, remarks, jokes, 
or posters-because of physical characteristics ("cripples"?), sexual 
orientation ("faggots"?), or national origin ("the yellow peril"?), for 
instance,-indeed, by cordoning off only such verbal conduct as re-
flecting offensively on some characteristics but not others (age, sexual 
orientation, national origin, veteran status, obesity?), the rule was dis-
criminatory in the bias of its restricted coverage: denying all others 
any standing to complain, and dismissing any complaint they might 
have as evidently of no equal worth-notwithstanding that this 
"speech" (this "verbal conduct") was belittling to them, notwithstand-
ing that it reduced them to stereotype, and notwithstanding that it 
6. 3RD ALTERNATIVE RuLE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff 
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment on campus, or some part 
thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a sexual, 
religious, or racial nature, and not otherwise." 
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subjected them to an offensive environment on campus or some part 
thereof. So what was the principle the rule sought to capture, after 
all? What did the council think it-the council itself-was actually 
about? How should the council frame a suitable rule neither overin-
clusive nor underinclusive of what "verbal conduct" was appropriate 
to forbid? 
More members of the council ~tirred uneasily in their seats. The 
university surely must, they had thought, work in the best way it could 
to assert a clear substantive stance on the right way of thinking about 
gender, religion; ab.d race. ID. large part, that very supposition was 
itself built into the rUle. In large part, moreover, many understood 
this to be part of the very function of the university (was it not?)-to 
educate their students, their employees, and, themselves on just such 
questions? Moreover, as already noticed, in some measure that posi-
tion was obvious from the formulation of the rule the council already 
had previously (albeit tentatively) approved. And, whether or not all 
agreed that that was so-about the proper mission of the university-
at a minimum it was already Virtually settled by the council as being so 
to the extent that it would forbid "offensive" verbal conduct respect-
ing characteristics ofgender, religion, or race, so to ban these abusive 
and hurtful acts from prejudicing the environment. So much had al-
ready virtually been agreed to, had it not? 
But was it true that the university had no equally determinable 
position on the "right" way of thinking, or expressing one's views, 
about other characteristics or differences? For example, about sexual 
orientation, or about age, or about national origin, or about economic 
class? But if not, then why_ not? ~ow did it distinguish what it was 
prepared to do from what it was not prepared to do? In other words, 
on what basis would it be a mere Pontius Pilate7 on these other things, 
when it was agreed on the things already proposed for the rule? In 
the face of baneful remarks belittling others for their sexual orienta-
tion, whether made to them or of them,8 for example, would the uni-
versity nonetheless refuse to consider the matter as of the same 
complainable sort as when baneful remarks of a religiously or racially 
aspersive sort were the object of complaint? Why should that be? 
7. I.e., refusing to pass judgment. 
8. Under the rule as it stood, it was the "environment" that mattered. It was not 
crucial that sexually demeaning expressions need be personally directed to a particular 
individual, for example, for certainly the display of sexually demeaning posters of women 
"as such" were meant to be reached under the rule as it now stood-and so, too, of course, 
in equivalent circumstances regarding race or religion as well. 
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And how would one account for the university's stance? What was its 
principle? 
And, again, why was it necessary? The council had resolved that 
it would not leave some "verbal conduct" to the inadequate response 
of a mere "free speech" campus. So much as this was already settled 
and clear. If the university would no longer leave some to the mercy 
of the "free speech campus," but would so leave others, it needed to 
explain its principle "up front." · It necessarily followed that the 
proper concern of the council, and the right objec;t of the right kind of 
rule, was to explain its principle up front, to identify the metric of the 
rule and explain why certain offensive statements were forbidden and 
others not, to give a foundation-not a mere institutional ipse dixit-
adequately distinguishing what offensive statements were forbidden 
from those statements not forbidden, regardless of their offensiveness, 
to distinguish mere bigotry (if that were the point of distinction) from 
what, though offensive, had value of some sort, on which account it 
would not be made the object of this rule. (though it seemed to reflect 
other attitudes one might equally resent, equally feel offended by, 
equally believe to be wrong or demorallZing), as many might believe 
to be true of Salman Rushdie's THE SATANIC VERSES-which no uni-
' versity would, or ought to be, prepared to forbid. Until that task was 
done, moreover, no useful, principled rule could be adopted ade-
quately distinguishing verbal conduct that would not be appropriate to 
forbid from that which the university would not tolerate or condone. 
The challenge laid down seemed to be worthy and fair to the 
council. In the course of the afternoon, it struggled at length to meet 
this challenge as best it could. In the end, however, the council could 
do no better than to adopt 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I.9 For even after 
elaborate further efforts to be more specific, it was agreed that noth-
ing significantly more instructive or more specific could be done. The 
council's own discussion served principally to make clear what per-
haps should have been obvious all along-that there was really no 
principle the council could state beyond "the principle" announced on 
9. 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I: "No member of the faculty, student body, or staff 
shall engage in any verbal conduct that renders the environment of the campus, or some 
part thereof, offensive. This rule shall apply, however, only if the verbal conduct is of a 
sexual, religious, racial, or other nature reflecting an improper and unreasonable attitude 
toward others according to the common standard of the university community, and not 
othecy.ise." 
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the face of 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I, and, in fact, it did quite accu-
rately reflect the operative standard after all else was said and done. 
Predictably, as all agreed, not all "denigrative" or all "negative" 
depictions were uniformly thought appropriate to forbid. Even if ex-
pressed emphatically, they might be correct or, if not perfectly correct, 
at least "understandable," and thus not condemnable as offensive 
"mere bigotry" as such. Necessarily, that is, some offensive ·speech 
(i.e., speech offensive to some persons because, in their view, deni-
grating of them) was not to be forbidden, consistent with the council's 
rejection of original RuLE I. A proper rule had to allow for this un-
derstanding. And 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I did so, articulating the 
differentiating principle as crisply as circumstances would allow. A 
substantial number of council members shared the view, for example, 
that the European discovery and subsequent displacement of Native 
Americans, beginning with Columbus and San Salvador, could be de-
scribed as "genocide." In keeping with that view, many likewise 
thought it not inappropriate-quite understandable, in fact-for Na-
tive American students to express themselves very aggressively about 
certain subjects, i.e., to speak aggressively about whites-of the 
"white man," and of "the white man's rape" of the continent, and "the 
white man's racism" as well. Oppositely, however, a denigrative de-
scription of Native Americans (as "aborigines," or as "backward peo-
ples" with a "primitive culture") would not pass without notice. And, 
moreover, at the least they were quite prepared to· vote for a rule 
sanctioning offensive stereotype depictions of Native Americans if con-
cretely carried into verbal conduct so to make some part of the campus 
an "offensive environment" for Native American students subjected 
either directly or indirectly to such affronts. They were confident their 
colleagues were willing to do no less.10 
Other members disagreed with this example (they thought it 
somewhat ill-chosen and subject to a good deal of uncertainty that 
their colleagues hadn't allowed for11), though they admitted that their 
10. They suggested, moreover, that under the federal civil rights acts {and the 
E.E.O.C. regulation, supra note 4), the university might be in violation of the federal acts 
were it not so to act and were it to fail to insure an environment for Native American 
employees, students, faculty, or staff, free of such denigrative stereotype depictions in the 
very day-to-day places where they would be expected to carry on their work within the 
university itself. 
11. For them, the example was troublesome partly because of its asymmetry-even as 
apparently exhibited in their colleague's own illustration: that it would privilege one offen-
sive kind of group epithet ("white persons" as "racists"?) while not privileging another 
(Native American peoples as "backward" or as subject to some other denigrative charac-
terization or some equivalently dismissive stereotype). Did their colleagues mean to sug-
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colleagues' view of its appropriate treatment was not without some 
measure of reason, as they felt about several, still different examples 
other council members put forth. 
As one such example, a member of the council asked whether 
pedophilia-a pronounced or even exclusive erotic longing for sexual 
intimacy with youngsters-was a category of "sexual orientation" the 
council believed to be indistinguishable in entitlement to be treated 
with equality of protection from verbal abuse on campus according to 
the proposed rule? The question went largely unanswered. Several 
council members stiffened at the question, suspicious of why such a 
matter was even raised, unless as a snide suggestion aimed actually at 
them, as gay and lesbian persons (which they were). Was the question 
raised to draw them out, either to "defend" their own gay or lesbian 
orientation in front of the council, or otherwise to accept the unstated 
but implied comparison of themselves with pedophiles? 
gest that the one hostile description (e.g., addressing whites as "racists") was less offensive, 
or somehow more legitimate (i.e., more warranted?) than the other? On what basis might 
they think so (or did they not regard this as genuinely contestable, though not everyone 
would be inclined to agree)? Or was it their view, rather, that a properly considered rule 
will lay down one kind of verbal conduct standard for certain students, faculty, staff, and 
employees, but a different standard for others whose expressions of animus were simply 
not to be treated the same way? Possibly. And possibly for a reason. But if so, what kind 
of rule is this, and how would one expect it to work? May not such a rule seem itself to say 
that some students (minority students?) are regarded not as being more in the right than 
others, but merely more pardonable as to their polemical excesses because not really equal 
after all (on which account they are not to be held to the same expectations of verbal 
behavior toward others on campus as others are expected to maintain toward them)? But 
insofar as this were its evident message, would it actually work to support them (as their 
colleagues obviously intended), or might it merely further undermine them-in so treating 
their offensive depictions of others as something the university expects others to pass off or 
ignore? Or were their colleagues suggesting that even if each description may be thought 
to be equally off the mark, and equally offensive in stigmatizing terms (e.g., whites as 
"racists"), still, given the status of some students on campus, their outbursts (such as they 
may be) are far more readily understandable, given the conditions they are unequally 
made to confront on campus, and, so, ought not be treated the same way. But how does 
this explanation really help at all? 
Similarly, in thinking about a different (but related) example, these council members 
wondered whether the rule as applied, as their colleagues had it in mind, would likewise 
mean to exempt from complaint denigrative speech that complains of, that belittles, or that 
dismissively stereotypes "white male European faculty members" and thereby makes the 
working environment offensive to them, but not likewise exempt denigrative speech that 
belittled or that stereotyped women faculty or "faculty persons of color"? If it declines to 
act in the same way in respect to each, however, how will the university explain its policy 
and its failure to treat "like complaints" alike? (On the other hand, if it acts with equal 
vigor so to reach both kinds of belittling verbal conduct equally, whose interests may 
thereby seem in fact to be more substantially served?) 
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Unknown to these council members, however, the question was 
asked by a faculty member interested in testing the council's princi-
ple-an anguished faculty member who himself subscribed to 
pedophile magazines and who lived in terrible dread of having his own 
orientation discovered. Moreover, he fully believed that the sexual 
distinctions drawri by others were themselves merely self-serving. He 
had hoped the council would respond not with silence, but positively 
to his idea. Inwardly, he was filled with dismay that his question had 
been treated as some miscarried, or tasteless, out-of-place remark. 
One member of the council hesitantly suggested that whether 
such an orientation would be protected by the verbal conduct rule 
would perhaps depend, at least partly-perhaps entirely-on 
"whether the leading national professional psychiatric and psychologi-
cal organizations still regarded such a person as sexually deviant 
rather than normal," in which case, he supposed, descriptions of 
pedophiles as "deviates" "needing treatment," could not be described 
as expressions of "bigotry," whereas descriptions of gays and lesbians 
as "deviates" "needing treatment" would be subject to sanction under 
the rule.12 But this altogether hapless effort to respond, so to draw 
some distinction according to how professional psychiatric and psy-
chological organizations happened to classify such things, served only 
to make the matter that much worse. 
But by now it was altogether apparent that this entire line of dis-
cussion would prove disastrous if allowed to proceed topic by topic, 
along any such lines as this. Other members of the council swiftly 
drew from this exchange the same conclusion as had already become 
quite obvious to others-that the council could not possibly go on in 
this way, now to adjudicate what was acceptable for some to say and 
what was not insofar as it made the environment offensive to others in 
some particular way. And it could not possibly make a definitive list 
of essentially forbidden expressions, so to distinguish them from un-
forbidden expressions, and adequately explain the difference-as it 
now was at risk of seeming to do. Neither could it possibly provide a 
suitable guideline list framed in any sufficient way to catch all that 
should be caught on the one hand (whatever that was), and yet leave 
untouched everything else, however offensive, appropriately pro-
12. He had in mind, of course, that such organizations had altered their views regard-
ing homosexuality some few decades earlier, no longer regarding such an orientation as 
abnormal (and thus not a condition one would seek to "treat" as these same organizations 
previously held}, but they had made no similar transition for pedophilia and a number of 
other sexual interests of a still somewhat more exceptional kind. 
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te'cted by an ample academic freedom and an ample campus freedom 
of speech. 
The thing to be done, therefore, was not to give up, but instead to 
stop with such agreement as could be reached now, so to frame the 
rule simply, specifically in the terms already proposed in 4TH ALTER-
NATIVE RULE I. Beyond this, the council clearly was not the appro-
priate place to settle anything else. Rather, as actual incidents might 
arise, consistent with the standard now framed on the face of the pro-
posed rule itself, the appropriate hearing board could sort them out: 
as complaints might be brought, hearings held, decisions made, and 
sanctions applied. In brief, the particular application of 4TH ALTER-
NATIVE RULE I would be determined under the procedures provided 
in RuLE 11.13 
To be sure, this regime might have its own difficulties, but so 
much was unavoidable, no matter what the council might do. The as-
sumption should be the practical one that "everyone would know" (or 
in any event quickly learn) what the "core" of unacceptable verbal 
conduct was to consist of and why. Nor would it be particularly help-
ful, it was agreed, for the council, having already framed the rule, to 
get into "explanations" or provide examples (they might themselves 
be insulting and misunderstood, or somehow taken the wrong way by 
some). Obviously, some basic sense of the community would inform 
the hearing committee; the council was both willing and eager to as-
sume that it would. There was, nearly all agreed, no obvious superior 
alternative to meet the objections that had been raised than that pro-
posed by 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I. Operating under this reformula-
tion of RULE I, the proper committee, already provided for under 
RULE II, would decide the appropriate disposition of each actual inci-
dent, according to the metric of the rule itself. And so the council de-
cided to do. 
vi. 
In the end, the key to the success in the final formulation and 
adoption of 4TH ALTERNATIVE RuLE I was the consensus on basic 
principle. Its basic principle was really quite clear, was it not?14 And 
much unlike original RULE I (which, the council pointed out to its 
13. RULE II: "Any member of the university community who engages in any verbal 
conduct contrary to Rule I shall be subject to suspension, dismissal, or other appropriate 
sanction as the Committee on Offensive Verbal Conduct shall decide." 
14. Assuming one thinks so, how might one· best express it? (And if one thinks it is 
somehow lacking in some particular, what different principle might one prefer to put in its 
stead?) 
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own satisfaction, had been squarely defeated), 4TH ALTERNATIVE 
RuLE I refused to make offensiveness per se the test. 4TH ALTERNA-
TIVE RuLE I was both different from and far better than original 
RuLE I because it was neither overinclusive nor underinclusive of 
properly sanctionable verbal conduct according to its own terms. Un-
less one's verbal conduct was both offensive and also of a nature re-
flecting an improper and unreasonable attitude toward others, as the 
rule declared, then one's verbal conduct remained outside the reach of 
the rule, i.e., it would not be subject to complaint and to sanction. 
This struck the council as being exactly as it should be. 
As thus amended and perfected, the ~le was no longer underin-
clusive because it would now treat "all like cases alike," so to apply 
equally, for instance, whether the object of one's denigration were 
some mental characteristic of others (e.g., "retards"), some physical 
characteristic ("cripples"), some sexual orientation characteristic 
("faggots"), or some other characteristic including (but now no longer 
limited to) race, religion, or gender. Rather, expressions of bigoted 
animus calculated to diminish the sense of self worth of others on 
campus, and to make the environment on campus15 a humiliating or 
oppressive place for them, would be reached whether of a sexual na-
ture or some other nature. In ~hat way, the amendment to the rule 
represented an obvious gain. 
Yet, the rule was not overinclusive, for it was no longer driven by 
the same censorship standard of original RuLE I. That standard, such 
as it was, and now rejected, was that the mere offensive, denigrative, 
belittling, or discriminatory character of one's speech (i.e., speech will-
fully designed to express a harsh or a negative view of others or of 
their practices), would, on that account, make it subject to complaint. 
But under the new rule, while this characteristic of one's speech was 
retained as a necessary condition, it would not be a sufficient condi-
tion. Specifically, that one's verbal conduct might express an animus 
toward others and be offensive to them, or that it belittled them, their 
beliefs, or their attitudes, or their values in some way, would not 
render it subject to complaint unless, in addition to being offensive in 
the manner or substance of its content (and whether or not it was of a 
sexual nature), it also reflected an improper and unreasonable attitude 
according to the common standard of the university-and all of this 
according to the specific terms of the rule itself. 
15. Or some part thereof. 
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So, to take a clear instance, applying this branch of the rule, even 
"hateful" denigrative expressions about a neo-Nazi student group on 
campus would be within the realm of protected expression, insofar as 
such expressions of rejection, based on a shared repugnance regarding 
neo-Nazis, could not be considered "unreasonable" or "improper" for 
a member of the university community to hold as a view, or to reflect 
straightforwardly in their speech. That they-the very persons or 
group(s) targeted by such speech-may feel themselves humiliated by 
such speech, that they may not like the way they are thus depicted, or 
that they may believe they are misunderstood, however, is neither 
here nor there, for surely one has a right to present one's opinions on 
neo-Nazis, whether neo-Nazis find themselves offended or not.16 
Neo-Nazis are properly left to the mercy of the free speech campus,17 
just as others18 properly are not. The whole challenge, of course, is to 
know how to draw the distinction. The example was, all agreed, an 
excellent example in serving so well to illustrate the real value of the 
full terms of the rule.19 
16. Indeed, what kind of university would it be that had a rule forbidding one to point 
out what one thinks to be the undesirable traits or qualities of persons of this sort 
(whatever one thinks persons of "this" sort means)? 
17. As also might be true, say, of those whose sexual taste may run to children (i.e., 
pedophiles) and similar deservingly disreputable groups, individuals, or beliefs, the im-
pugning of which could not be said to reflect an "improper and unreasonable attitude" 
according to "the common standard" of the university. 
18. I.e., all those protected by the proposed rule. 
19. That certain verbal conduct offending men on campus (e.g., reiterated descriptions 
depicting them as lascivious, to be watched out for as prone to sexual exploitation, to vio-
lence, to rape, and to the subordination of women) would likewise not be subject to the 
rule, most on the council thought likely as well (unless one were prepared to declare that 
such negative depictions, cautions, and warnings (about men) would be held to reflect to 
an "unreasonable" and "improper" attitude, which they thought unlikely-for who is pre-
pared so to insist that they do?). That such depictions may be resented by many men, or 
rejected as false by at least some men, as well as stigmatizing of them, as well as offensive, 
is ~either here nor there. For again, this rule avoids making these matters (the alleged felt 
falseness of the depiction, the resentment of those depicted, or its offensiveness to some 
person or some group) a sufficient ground, as it rightly should. But, in contrast with these 
cases, on the other hand, perhaps most (perhaps all) expressions of animus or belittlement 
of gay or lesbian persons (though not necessarily of pedophiles), or of women (though not 
necessarily of men), or of most racial groups (though not necessarily of whites), when car-
ried into offensive words or graphics on campus, would be subject to complaint and to 
definite sanction under RULE IT-reflecting (as they surely would be held so to reflect) an 
"improper" as well as an "unreasonable" attitude according to the metric of the rule. On 
all such matters, the rule is fully equal to the demands made upon it according to its own 
terms: the rule takes suitable care to identify the proper framework for e:<>rrect judg-
ment-not the framework of what "outsiders" think, but what "the university" thinks on 
each of these matters ("the common standard of the university" is the standard made to 
count). What could be more appropriate than this, in framing a speech code for the uni-
versity, neither overinclusive nor yet underinclusive of university-sanctionable speech? 
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Those terms were crafted with care so to provide the most honest 
statement of what the rule-or any (i.e., every) rule of just this sort-
actually represents in the end. The council agreed this was so, and 
shortly thereafter likewise agreed it was time to adjourn. First, how-
ever, the two salutary rules, 4TH ALTERNATIVE RULE I and RULE II, 
were approved to the accompaniment of two cheers for a better cam-
pus environment, for academic freedom, and for the due protection of 
an appropriate freedom of speech. And only then did the members of 
the council file out from the room in which they had met.20 
20. . .. Except for a small lingering group off in one comer-who thought they caught 
a slight whiff of diesel fumes, and a slight sound, as of tanks clanking, as in some far away 
deserted Square. 
